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Abstract. This edited conference volume is another from Springer on the Studies in 
Political Economy under the editorship of Prof. Norman Schofield, the Dr. William Taussig 
Professor of Political Economy Professor, Department of Political Science at Washington 
University. Political Economy is a fast growing field that uses the logic of economics to 
study issues pertaining to politics and governance and of which Prof. Schofield has been 
one the most prolific contributors over the last four decades. This volume brings together 
the papers presented at the Political Economy of Governance, Institutions and Elections 
workshop that took place in Baiona, Spain in April 2014. Political Economy is a vast and 
growing field as such this volume is only representative of the many issues and the 
modelling techniques—both theoretical and empirical—used to address them. The topics 
and issues addressed in this volume span a great variety of subjects covering—as the title 
indicates—issues dealing with governance, institutions and elections. The chapters in this 
volume are not only innovative, but they challenge and engage the reader into thinking 
more deeply about the issues addressed. One of the major characteristic of this volume is 
that most papers directly or indirectly contest the existing body of knowledge by either 
providing alternatives ways of thinking about a problem not addressed in the main stream 
literature or by studying issues that have up to know been ignored in the literature. This 
review is organized as follows. Section 1 gives an overview of how institutions work or 
change over time within a country; Section 2, those dealing with different aspects of 
democracy and Section 3 those dealing with the workings of elections. Concluding 
comments are given in Section 4. 
Keywords. Political economy, Institutions, Democracy, Elections. 
JEL. F50, D72. 
 
1. Institutions 
nstitutions are crucial to the workings of any political system, be it a 
presidential or parliamentary democracy, an absolute dictator who governs with 
a close elite or in anocracies—or partial democracies—those were the autocrat 
governs alongside a legislature and exerts undue influence in elections and in the 
legislature. 
As Williamson (2000, 575) wrote we are ―still very ignorant about institutions‖ 
mainly because institutions are very complex entities. The New Institutional 
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Economic (NIE) literature that has emerged since then and to which the chapters in 
this volume contribute, aims at increasing our understanding of the workings of 
institutions across different political systems by examining the incentives 
institutions give economic and political decision makers—governments, parties, 
voters, firms and interest groups. Seven chapters‘ study the evolution of institutions 
in different countries over time and under different political regimes. The general 
themes include the effect of historical institutions on present institutions; the 
influence institutions have on the interactions between different political and 
economic actors; whether the judiciary is independent of the government; and the 
determinants of institutional quality across countries. 
A common theme among three of the chapters dealing with institutions is the 
persistent effect that past institutions have on the current political and economic 
agents today and how past institutions shape present day institutions. Peisakhin 
examines the cultural legacy that the Russian and Austrian institutions have on the 
political division in present day Ukraine, Sotostudies the cultural legacy of 
institutions on regional inequality, and Caballero and Álvarez-Díazsurvey the 
evolution of institutions in Spain over the last 75 years. 
In ―Cultural Legacies: Persistence and Transmission‖ Peisakhin argues that 
even though institutions evolve over time, the effect of institutions that disappeared 
long ago leave a cultural legacy that affects the working of institutions for 
generations to come. To make his point he uses a natural experiment that occurred 
when the Austrian and Russian empires split the relatively homogeneous Ukrainian 
population in a particular area. Using regressions analysis, he finds evidence that 
current political divisions in the Ukrainian population can be traced back to this 
split. Using survey data collected on families that remained in ―homogeneous‖ 
communities, he finds that current political views and divisions are highly 
correlated with the socio-political and cultural identities that were transmitted 
within these families over several generations. 
In his ―The Historical Origins of Regional Economic Inequality in Spain: The 
Cultural Legacy of Political Institutions,‖ Soto uses the well-known argument that 
better economic performance is associated with cultural traits—such as generalized 
trust, orientation toward political issues, associative participation, attitudes toward 
individual independence—to argue that these traits are not only highly persistent 
over time but are also shaped by political experiences in the distant past. He uses 
two historical political features that exhibit regionally variation across Spain: the 
political institutions that prevailed in the Early Modern Age that imposed political 
constraints on the executive from 1600 to 1850and the level of local autonomy in 
the High Middle Ages, in particular, in the formation process of the local legal 
order between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries. Using regression analysis, he 
finds that these two historical political institutions have a substantial effect on 
current regional economic distribution even after controlling for geographic and 
human capital factors. 
Caballero and Álvarez-Díaz document the institutional changes that took place 
from 1939—when General Franco took over the reins of power and instituted 
himself as a dictator after the Spanish civil war—to present day in their chapter on 
that ―Institutional Change in Spain from Francoism to Democracy: The Effects of 
the Great Recession.‖ They argue that the institutions designed by Franco in his 
early years created incentives for his cronies to pillage the economy getting a larger 
share of a smaller pie but that to stay in office Franco evolved modernizing the 
institutions that governed the economic and political life of the country in the 
1950s. Their analysis shows that the institutional reforms implemented in 1959 led 
to the re-emergence of economic markets and economic growth and development. 
They argue that after Franco‘s death in 1975, institutional changes culminated in 
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the emergence a new self-enforcing institutional framework that created political 
reform leading to democracy, the adhesion to the EU and an Europeanization of 
civil society, a decentralization political process, social and cultural modernization, 
the making of a Welfare State and leading to an unprecedented economic growth 
that ended when the huge economic crisis of the Great Recession of 2008 hit Spain. 
They maintain that the changes that occurred in Spain‘s political landscape after 
the great Recession where brought about by new social movements whose distrust 
and dissatisfaction with current political institutions had been growing for a while. 
Using regression analysis, they find evidence on the existence of a long-run 
relationship between economic crisis and political trust inSpain, in particular that 
economic crisis exerts a negative impact on political trust. 
Four other chapters examine how institutions shape the interactions between 
different political and economic actors: Nonell and Medina on social pacts in 
different European countries; Eggertsson on the effect of voters on governance of 
fisheries in Iceland; Desierto on the influence of the government on the Chief 
Justice in the Philippines; and Javed on the determinants of institutional quality on 
IMF Programme and non-Programme countries. 
In ―Comparative Analysis of Institutional Incentives and Organizational 
Adjustment of Social Actors in Eight European Countries,‖ Nonell and Medina 
examine policy-making when there are institutional differences across social actors 
in different European countries. They look at the social pacts that emerge in these 
countries and how these pacts can be reinforced or hindered by social actors, their 
strengths and the effects these have on economic outcomes. Their study bring out 
the effects that different types of bargaining systems have and how these depend on 
whether they are based on institutional rewards and political rationales or on 
centralized and coordinated bargaining.  
Eggertsson‘s thought provoking chapter on the ―Demand for Wealth Reducing 
Institutional Change. The Role of Ideas and Interests‖ challenges us to think about 
how the widespread demand for changes to the regulatory system governing the 
Icelandic fisheries—that were implemented after the devastating effect that the 
2008 global financial crises had on Iceland—generated large wealth reducing 
effects. He develops a well-though out argument showing how the changes 
implemented by the government lead de-facto to a deep institutional change and 
how those changes deceased welfare in Iceland. He convincingly argues that 
political pressure coupled with the general miss-understanding on the workings of 
the fisheries lead the government to respond to popular demands that in the end 
reduced the welfare of everyone in the country.   
Desier to heads in a completely different direction studying the independence of 
the judicial system in the Philippines in ―Judicial Independence: Evidence from the 
Philippine Supreme Court 1970–2003.‖ She examines the decisions of the ten 
Chief Justices as they pertain to government cases in the two years prior and two 
years after their appointment as Chief Justices. Her regression analysis indicates 
that there are significant differences in the probability of favoring the government, 
prior to and post-appointment. This suggests that during this period the Chief 
Justice favored the government, thus providing evidence that during this period 
there was no judicial independence in the Philippines. 
In ―Institutional Determinants: A Case Study of IMF Programme and Non-
Programme Countries,‖ Javed examines the economic and political determinants of 
institutional quality during the 1980–2009 period by distinguishing between IMF 
non-Programme and Programme countries, period in which the IMF was 
particularly active. The contribution of this chapter, relative to the literature, is that 
it finds evidence that institutional quality falls when the military is in power, but 
develops with improvements in property rights, openness, aggregate governance, 
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real GDP growth, and enhancement in monetary system, investment freedom. They 
recommend that the IMF focus on improving institutional quality in their 
Programme countries. 
These chapters also highlight that the evolution of institutions is not a static but 
a dynamic concept and that its evolution is by no means linear. Institutions can 
progress or regress depending on random events that hit the country and the 
economy in which they operate. 
 
2. Democracy 
The innovative work presented in this Section involves theories and empirical 
work thatcontest traditional and well established views or theories, by presenting 
non-traditional models of current social choices. These chapters challenge current 
theories by providing alternative theories and modeling approaches showing that 
these well-known results in the literature depend on assumptions that up to know 
were believed to be in a sense harmless in terms of the results derived from them. 
Anderson, Holt, Sieberg and Oldham challenge the well-known but surprising 
theoretical result of Feddersen & Pesendorfer‘s (1998) on the Condorcet Jury 
theorem in their chapter ―An Experimental Study of Jury Voting Behavior.‖They 
design an experiment to test whether the conviction of innocent defendants is more 
likely under unanimity than majority voting rules when jurors have private 
information and vote strategically rather than sincerely. To test this they make the 
cost of convicting an innocent defendant higher than that of acquitting a guilty 
defendant, so that the threshold of reasonable doubt is set at a level higher than the 
usual 50% threshold. They find no evidence of strategic voting and no difference 
between the unanimity and majority rules. Juries, in their experiment, found it 
difficult to convict with no incorrect convictions occurring. To explain this they 
suggest that the risk neutrality assumption used in these type of models may 
prompt misleading conclusions as the high cost of convicting the innocent can 
interact with jurors‘ risk aversion to produce an even higher threshold of 
reasonable doubt than the results obtained when jurors‘ are risk neutral, which 
tends to neutralize the negative effects of strategic voting under a unanimity rule. 
In ―Trading Portfolios: The Stability of Coalition Governments,‖ Demirkaya 
and Schofield explicitly model niche non-mainstream parties who are interested 
only in specific issues with strong preferences along these dimensions to study the 
effect that niche parties have on the allocation of ministries in coalition 
governments. They examine whether the higher value niche parties place on 
ministries—relative to mainstream parties—gives them an advantage in the 
allocation of ministries. In their model, two mainstream parties and a niche party 
divide a portfolio of three ministries. They compare the stable coalitions between 
the two mainstream parties and those between the mainstream party and a niche 
party and show that when the niche party forms a stable coalition it gets a higher 
payoff than the mainstream party, thus making the niche party a less desirable 
coalition partner. 
To study the distribution of parliamentary rents between parties, in ―Rent 
Seeking and the Size of Parliamentary Majorities.‖ Klingelhöfer develops a two-
party model where the minority party may capture a parliamentary majority by 
bribing members of the majority faction to switch party. Even though in 
equilibrium, the majority party control parliament, the electoral outcome is affected 
by the parliamentary rent-game played between parties after the election. He shows 
that since larger majorities require lower rent payments, voters face a trade-off 
between lowering rent payments by supporting the party that wins the election or 
supporting their preferred party. Not only the electoral game has multiple equilibria 
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in which either party wins, but the size of the equilibrium majority is larger than 
when no post-electoral bribes are possible. 
The chapters by Kselman and Serraexamine the effect that the selection of US 
Presidential candidates in the primaries has on the convergence or divergence of 
candidates‘ electoral platforms. Both models challenge the view that the primaries 
generates platform divergence. In addition, the chapter by Eguia and Giovannoni 
challenges the view that in a one dimensional policy space with three or more 
alternatives the median policy is always chosen. 
Kselman models elections as a two-stage Downsianone-dimensional electoral 
game where the candidates selected by each party in the primary run against each 
other in the election in his chapter ―A Median-Activist Theorem for Two-Stage 
Spatial Models.‖ He finds that party voters (the selectorate of the party and/or the 
median party activist) only exert a centrifugal force—a pull on party platforms 
away from the median voter‘s ideal policy—under fairly strict conditions; and only 
if candidates attach fairly high value to winning the nomination but losing the 
election. His ―median-activist theorem‖ suggests that if candidates place little value 
on winning the nomination in and of itself, primaries are necessary, but not 
sufficient, for generating more extreme electoral platforms. 
Serra extends Down‘s (1957) one dimensional spatial model by introducing 
primary elections in his chapter ―No Polarization in Spite of Primaries: A Median 
Voter Theorem with Competitive Nominations.‖He finds that even though 
candidates have significant incentives to diverge from the median voter‘s ideal 
point, they still converge to the median and argues that this suggest that primaries 
are not sufficient to create polarization by themselves but that it is the other 
complementary features of these models that interact with the primaries leading 
candidates to diverge from the center. 
A common held belief is that in one dimensional policy spaces, the median 
alternative is always chosen.   Eguia and Giovannoni challenge this view in their 
chapter on ―A Comment on Choice Rules and Median Outcomes ―as they find that 
when there are three or more alternatives to choose from, non-median outcomes 
cannot be ruled out, even if all voters have linear Euclidean preferences. 
Challenges to the way politics is conducted today have led to the emergence of 
a distinct bread of parties in various countries. Supporters of these new parties want 
greater input into the policy-making process within the party. Ramos and Puy 
provide a model in which one party does not follow the traditional procedure for 
establishing their policy platform in ―Downsian Competition with Assembly 
Democracy.‖ Their model examines the effect that the emergence non-traditional 
parties—whose policy platform is chosen directly by their supporters—has on the 
electoral outcome. They model political competition between a traditional party 
who implements its ideal policy if elected and a party whose policies are selected 
by an assembly of citizens. The non-traditional ―assembly‖ party uses a two-step 
procedure to select its policies: in the first stage assembly citizens chooses a set of 
pre-election policies on which the party runs in the election; then if elected the 
policy that is implemented is chosen by a post-election assembly from among the 
set of policies chosen by the pre-electoral assembly. At the electoral stage, voters 
chose between a lottery over the multiple proposals of the ―assembly‖ party and the 
ideal policy of the traditional party. Their results show that extremist assembly 
parties induce the traditional party to locate at the median policy position, whereas 
centrist assembly parties move the traditional party away from the median and in 
the opposite direction of the assembly‘s median. Centrist assemblies, with respect 
to extremist assemblies, have more chances of winning the elections. 
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Khouri-Hagot and Lemennicier challenge the view that voting weights and 
voting powers are the same in international organizations. Their framework shows 
that voting weights and voting powers are not necessarily equal in ―How Should 
Votes Be Weighted to Reflect the Existing and ―Calculated‖ Distribution of Voting 
Power of Weighted Voting Organizations Integrating Different Majority 
Requirements?‖ Voting weights are measured by the number of votes allocated to 
each member and voting power by the ability of a member to influence voting 
outcomes. They show that while, in general, ―calculated‖ voting powers—
measured by the normalized Banzhaf index—tend to be linearly related to voting 
weights, the powers of larger countries either exceed or fall short of their 
proportional weight and show that their powers depend on majority voting 
requirements used in the decision. The 2008 voting and power weights are studied 
for the following weighted voting international organizations: African 
Development Bank (AfDB), International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Their findings show that when voting 
takes place under simple (qualified) majority, the voting powers of larger 
contributors are greater (smaller) than their voting weights. They also examine how 
votes should be weighted if they are to reflect the existing and ―calculated‖ 
distribution of voting power and examine the potential ―calculated‖ voting powers 
of larger countries given their ―existing‖ voting weight when if these countries are 
to maintain the proportionately between weight and voting power of all other 
smaller countries. This allows them to estimate the opportunity cost of cooperation 
in international organizations in terms of loss of power as well as to provide an 
estimation of the minimum implicit gains which cover these costs. 
 
3. Elections 
The chapters in this section challenge the general view that parties always tend 
to converge to centrist positions in both one dimensional and multi-dimensional 
policy spaces. 
Schofield and Kurellastudy the role of German activists on party positions in 
their chapter on ―Party Activists in the 2009 German Federal Election.‖They 
extend Schofield‘s (2007) model to account for German parties adopting divergent 
platforms by including a valence term—a non-policy component in voters‘ utility 
function—measuring an overall perceived external popularity or competence of 
each candidate that is exogenous and constant among the voters and including 
voter specific partisan bias or ideological distances to party positions. They show 
that this stabilizes the formal game of party competition by diminishing the 
probability of parties leapfrogging each other in equilibrium configurations. Yet 
they still find that the predictions of the models show significant discrepancy to 
empirical party configurations. They argue that in Germany it is voters and not 
interest groups that by making donations are those demanding polarization in party 
platforms. The identity of the activists is driven by German‘s regulatory limitations 
on donations to parties.  
Formal electoral models assume that countries are unitary actors and so the 
models are developed assuming that there are no sub-national entities that would 
affect national elections. Yet sub-national jurisdictions play important roles in 
determining the outcome of national elections. Labzina and Schofield develop and 
test a model for the 2010 British National election in which they account for the 
fact that in Scotland and Wales there are regional parties that did not run in 
England but that affect the national electoral outcome. To deal with regional parties 
in Britain they develop a national-regional model of British elections in 
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―Application of the Variable Choice Logit Model to the British General Election of 
2010‖. Their model allows voters to vote for the Scottish National Party in 
Scotland and for Plaid Cymru in Wales, in addition voting for the three national 
parties that run England: the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats and Labour. 
They adapt the theoretical model of Yamomoto (2011) of the varying choice logit 
to allow voters to face different parties in different regions and find that while the 
Welsh party Plaid Cymru is not maximizing its vote share where it to locate at the 
electoral mean; the other parties do converge to the electoral mean. 
Matakos, Troumpounis and Xefteris study the effect of the degree of electoral 
rule disproportionality on voter turnout in ―Turnout and polarization under 
alternative electoral systems‖. In their electoral competition model parties 
‗platforms are endogenously chosen and depend on the degree of electoral rule 
disproportionality. They show that proportional electoral systems generate 
centrifugal forces that increase candidate differentiation, and that this leads to 
lower levels of voter abstention—due to indifference between parties—in more 
proportional systems. Using regression analysis, they find that in proportional 
representation systems there is higher voter turnout even after jointly controlling 
for the prevailing pivotality and party-system size hypotheses. 
Artes and Jurado challenge the empirical methods used to assess claims on the 
causes of government overspending. Even though the public spending literature 
argues that in multi-agent decision-making process tend to produce public 
overspending, empirical studies on the effect of minorities and coalition 
governments on spending have failed to find strong support for this hypothesis. 
They examine deficits in sub-national Spanish jurisdictions in ―Fiscal deficits and 
type of government: a study of Spanish local elections‖ and develop credible 
arguments highlighting the reasons for the empirical evidence being mixed. The 
thrust of their arguments is that standard regression models do not accurately 
capture unobserved heterogeneity that exists between jurisdictions. Using data 
from Spanish municipalities from 2004 to 2011 and four typical estimation 
methods—mean comparison, OLS, fixed effects regression, and matching—they 
argue and present evidence that only the matching technique captures the 
unobserved heterogeneity and selection bias present in these types of governments. 
After developing a technique to account for the fact that minority governments in 
municipalities do not arise randomly as required by the matching model, their 
results show that minorities run lower surpluses than single party majorities. 
Pavia and Toboso tackle the debate regarding the election of US Presidents by 
the Electoral College when the candidate fails to win a majority of the popular vote 
in ―Federalism, proportionality and popular will in US presidential elections: did 
Colorado have the right idea?‖They argue that there are intermediate proposal 
between those advocated by supporters and abolishers of the Electoral College. In 
their view, an intermediate solution would continue to respect the spirit of the US 
as a federal nation while enabling proportionality to be incorporated into the 
process. One such solution is that proposed by the Amendment 36 to the Colorado 
Constitution. They examine what would have happened if the Colorado proposal 
had been implemented nationwide in Presidential elections from 1828 to 2012 and 
show that this proposal might have made the Electoral College‘ results closer to 
popular will, would have diminished the risk of electing a non-popular winning 
President and would have require the elected President to have a more balanced 
regional support but that it would have encouraged the emergence of third minor 
candidates. 
 
4. Conclusions 
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This volume presents important work that challenges existing theories and 
evidence on institutions, democracy and elections. The chapters contribute to our 
understanding on the persistent effect of historical institutions on current 
institutions and on the decisions of different economic and political actors; on how 
governments are forced to induce changes in institutions and how these changes 
may take decades to materialize; on how popular demands induce government to 
make institutional changes that may not be welfare enhancing. The Democracy 
chapters challenge view on the Condorcet Jury theorem; gives a better 
understanding of how niche parties affect the stability of coalition governments via 
their demand on ministries; on the distribution of parliamentary rents across 
parties; on the effect of primaries on platform divergence; on convergence to the 
ideal policy of the median voters in one dimensional policy spaces; on the 
emergence of non-traditional more consultative parties and the effect their have on 
elections; and on the distinction of voting weights and voting powers in 
international organizations. Under elections, we were presented with models 
dealing with the influence of activists on the election; on the effect that sub-
national jurisdictions have on the election when there are parties that run only in 
some jurisdictions but not in others; on the effect that electoral disproportionality 
of the electoral system has on voter turnout; on how the majority/minority status of 
municipal governments determine the deficits/surpluses run by these governments 
and on how the Electoral College could be made more proportional and its effects 
on the identity of the winning US Presidential candidates. 
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